On July 26, 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser made a move that was to change the balance in the Middle East and mark the transition from pre-war colonialism to the post-war world: he announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. This move was surprising to Westerners, but not inexplicable.
On September 27 of the previous year, Nasser concluded an agreement for the purchase of Soviet weapons systems from Czechoslovakia. The Arab world was elated, but the West and Israel were worried: for the first time an Arab leader was moving away from Western hegemony and turning openly against the West and the dependency regime. The possibility of overturning the military balance in the Middle East greatly troubled Westerners and especially the Anglo-French. On the one hand, the conservative Prime Minister of Britain, Anthony Eden, likened Nasser to Hitler, while at the same time France was unhappy mainly because of Egypt’s support (military and political) to the Algerian national liberation movement.
Despite the shift towards the Soviet Union, Nasser was careful not to sever his ties with the West, requesting, in the fall of 1955, financial assistance for the construction of the Aswan Dam. Britain and the US responded to this request, believing that dependent on the West, Egypt would not turn further towards the Soviets. However, this cooperation did not succeed, as the British and the Americans suspended the provision of aid due to the restoration of diplomatic relations between Egypt and the People’s Republic of China (which was not recognized by Western countries at the time), but mainly because of the positive response of Nasser to the Soviet proposal for financial and logistical assistance in the construction of the Aswan Dam.
Nasser’s surprise announcement about the Suez Canal came in response to this Western backsliding. Britain considered that this caused a decisive blow to the interests of the empire and decided, together with the French, to take military action, but also involving Israel. In a secret meeting at an air base near Paris, it was decided that Israel would launch an invasion of Egypt, heading for Suez, and then the Anglo-French would intervene, demanding in the name of free navigation that the two belligerents withdraw to a distance of 10 miles from the canal. In the event that Egypt did not agree, the Anglo-French would occupy the canal area.
Indeed, the plan was put into effect on 29 October and the impending military invasion announced on 31 October. The USA reacted immediately, trying not to be associated with the colonial heritage of European countries and not to allow the strengthening of Arab radicalism. President Eisenhower addressed the United Nations Security Council demanding the withdrawal of the Israelis from Egypt and the non-violent involvement of any member of the UN. Despite the Anglo-French veto, in the end, the General Assembly approved by a vote of 65 to 5 the proposal for the end of hostilities and the withdrawal of foreign troops.
However, the Anglo-French were not deterred, continuing their military operations, with the Soviet Union subsequently becoming involved in the situation, calling for an end to the attack on Egypt and the intervention of the UN, at the same time leaving hints that a third world war could break out with the use of nuclear weapons. President Eisenhower in turn warned of an imminent US response in the event of military action by the Soviets, while refusing to provide financial aid to Britain and threatening to sell British stocks, which would contribute to the devaluation of sterling.
Anthony Eden, under enormous political and economic pressure, announced a cease-fire, but without informing France and Israel. The political cost of his handling was great, leading to his resignation on 9 January 1957. The humiliation of England and France highlighted the shift of power from the pre-war colonial world dominated by Britain to the post-war world in which the new power vacuum America covered.
Nasser’s bold move catapulted his prestige in the eyes of the Arab world, paving the way for Arab nationalism. On the other hand, France focused on unhooking itself from the American factor, seeking to build a strong and united Europe and to acquire an independent nuclear capability.
More broadly, the Suez crisis defined the balance of power in the Middle East for years to come. On the one hand, the Soviet Union emerged as a supporter of Arab nationalism, being the main source of armaments for many Arab states. On the other hand, the US sided with Israel and the then pro-Western regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, Libya and Iran.
Column editor: Myrto Katsigera, Vassilis Minakakis, Antigone-Despina Poimenidou, Athanasios Syroplakis
