The initiative of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) to proceed with the declassification and publication of archival material relating to the coup against Makarios and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus has undoubtedly been a welcome development for those interested in gaining a better knowledge of the dramatic events that took place on Megalonisos in the summer of 1974. In any case, the study of the 58 information bulletins (ID) of the Central Intelligence Service (KYP) does not overturn, on the contrary rather confirms the conclusions reached by modern scholars of the Cypriot tragedy, primarily Alexis Papachelas. On the other hand, the information conveyed by the editors of the newsletters and the opinions (comments) they express illuminate unseen aspects of the events and reflect dominant perceptions that prevailed in the KYP during a transitional period: from the collapse of Dimitrios Ioannidis’s dictatorship to return of Konstantinos Karamanlis to Greece; and from the coup against Makarios to the occupation of 37% of the Cypriot territory by the Turkish invaders.
A study of the published archival material leaves no doubt that the president of the Republic of Cyprus and the developments on the island were under the microscope of the KYP. What particularly worries the authors of the information bulletins is the decision of Archbishop Makarios to proceed with the “sanitization” of the National Guard (D.P. 1/7/1974) and the “removal of the Greek Officers from Cyprus and the replacement of these “Greek expatriate officers, royalists and opponents of the revolution” (D.P. 4/7/1974). A possible departure of the (juntist) Greek officers from the National Guard – comments the editor – would have disastrous consequences for Cyprus, not only because “Makarios, now surrounded by the Communists, will be guided by them, unable to act otherwise” (D .P. 5/7/1974), but also because such a development he found “the Turkish side to be against it, since the presence of the Turkish minority in the Islands is a guarantee for the safety of» (D.P. 9/7/1974).
On the other hand, the editor of the bulletins, most probably the CYP itself, not only do they not appear to have been involved in the coup against Makarios, they were not even aware of it. So, on her report card July 15, 1974which covered time until eight in the morning of the same day (the coup occurred at 08.30), it is estimated that Makarios will continue to be the president of the Republic of Cypruseven exerting pressure on the Athens junta “to take action to dissolve EOKA B”. It is also characteristic that in the bulletins of the immediately preceding days, extensive references were made to the inter-community talks, with the editor commenting that they “have not presented any difficulty, but they have not achieved impressive results either, since the examination of serious issues of the Local Government is expected” ( D.P. 10/7/1974).
After the coup, the intelligence reports inform the center (and indeed quite accurately) about the mobilization of the Turkish forces: “The preparation of the landing forces continues, both to carry out a training program and to be ready to undertake a military mission against Cyprus », commented the editor on July 19, a few hours before the event of the Turkish invasion. For the next three days the bulletins are interrupted, probably due to the stormy developments on Megalonissos and the prevailing panic. However, from July 23, the normal flow is restored, with intelligence reports now recording in every detail the movements of the Turkish army, not only in Cyprus, but also in Eastern Thrace and Western Asia Minor – which testifies to the clear concern of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about possible Turkish aggression against Greece itself.
“The preparation of the landing forces continues, both for the execution of the training program and for the readiness to undertake a military mission against Cyprus”, commented the editor on July 19, a few hours before the Turkish invasion.
After the completion of the first phase of the Turkish invasion on July 24, the intelligence reports are full of analyzes about the attitude of other states and international actors towards the Cyprus case. In this context, they call the favorable acceptance in the West of the collapse of the dictatorship and the formation of the government of national unity under K. Karamanlis “a happy development, because it is the beginning of a change in the climate in favor of Greece and will have favorable effects on the ongoing existing national issue” (D.P. 26/7/1974). As, however, the negotiations at the Geneva Conference (25-30 July and 10-14 August 1974) are gradually led to a dead end, both Britain and the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, are heavily criticized for pro-Turkish policies. In fact, Britain appears not only to have reinforced the Turks and the Turkish Cypriots “during the days of military operations” (D.P. 5/8/1974), but even to have “motivated” Turkey “in its ablative action in Cyprus” (D.P. 14/8/1974) – something that is certainly not confirmed by historical research. During this period, moreover, the attitude of the USA is characterized as “biased” (D.P. 8/7/1974) and “clearly pro-Turkish” (D.P. 15/8/1974), whose priority is to avoid a Greek-Turkish war.
On the eve of “Attila II”, the information bulletins of the KYP record the mobility of the Turkish army and carry reports of the Turkish press about a new aggressive action in Cyprus. At the same time, however, the American concerns “over a possible military expansion project by Turkey in Cyprus” are characterized as “exaggerated”, with the August 13 editor considering that these were “deliberately directed towards the Greek sideso that, on the one hand, this would demonstrate intransigence during the Geneva talks and, on the other hand, justify the biased stance in favor of the USA”. After the completion of the second phase of the Turkish invasion, the intelligence reports speak of the “proven guilt” of the USA “for the drama of Cyprus” (D.P. 17/8/1874) and express their displeasure at the “pro-Turkish » attitude of the White House (D.P. 21/8/1974).
There is no doubt that the material made public by EYP will “contribute to a better understanding of what happened then“, as the EYP commander, ambassador, rightly raised the issue Themistocles Demiris. Indeed, the scientific exploitation of 58 KYP information sheets, combined with a rich archive material at our disposal – and which is constantly being enriched – offers possibilities for new studiesdistanced from conspiracy theories and simplistic interpretations, which do not serve the honest assessment of the historical past.
Mr. Manolis Koumas is an assistant professor of History of International Relations at the Department of History and Archeology of EKPA.
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Center photo: July 25, 1974. Turkish soldiers in an armored personnel carrier, a few hundred meters away from Greek forces defending Nicosia airport. The 58 declassified information sheets of the KYP give clear information about what Athens knew in the critical hours from the coup against Makarios to the second phase of the Turkish invasion. Photo AP/Max Nash
